For this week’s Turning Point, we’ll break down the coin flip.  Only kidding of course, but more on that in a moment.

Last Thursday night’s contest was full of momentum shifts.  The Jets scored on their first four possessions (one of them a kickoff return touchdown) to jump out to an early 24-6 lead.  Afterwards the Patriot defense/special teams adjusted, allowing New York nothing on their next five non-kneeldown drives.  Meanwhile, New England’s offense gradually chipped away at the deficit, finally tying the game early in the 4^th quarter.  The Jets subsequently rattled off a sustained, clock-killing drive (14 plays, 63 yards, 7:06 elapsed) that ended with a go-ahead touchdown.  The teams traded three-and-outs, with the Patriots using their time outs, the two minute warning and a stout defensive effort to give them one last shot with 1:04 remaining.  It took Cassel only 1:03 to erase any lingering doubts about his clutchness as he delivered an on-the-run game-tying TD to a perfectly-covered Moss in the corner of the end zone (time index; 4:44).  Cassel led his team on two game-tying 4^th quarter drives, although officially it only counts as one comeback.

Due to sudden death overtime rules, however, he was unable to build on it, making the eventual overtime loss all the more bitter.  Ranting about overtime invites hypocrisy given New England’s 7-0 record under Belichick & Brady (with plenty of fortunate bounces and breaks) prior to Thursday night.  And griping about rules that have been in place for 34 years may ring hollow compared to the NFL’s other glaring problems, among them horrific, consequence-free officiating and a humorless, dictatorial commissioner.  Therefore the author begs your indulgence.

This season we’ve witnessed the greatest amount of parity, Tennessee and the defending champs aside, since 2002.  Former commissioner Pete Rozelle’s dying legacy was to establish an even economic playing field, the idea being that the talent level would likewise equilibrate and give every team a chance to succeed.  What does parity have to do with overtime?  If the spirit of the former is to promote competitiveness, why not do the same for the latter by giving each team at least one possession?  Under the current archaic system, the winner of the overtime coin toss prevails 60% of the time.  In a league of parity, the stakes are too high for the outcome of games to be determined at random; as the PD editor pointed out yesterday, the overtime loss dropped the Patriots from the #3 AFC seed to being out of the playoff picture entirely.

Following an 18-15 setback to the Colts in Week 9, the Patriots entered a critical stretch of three straight divisional games, the first two of which would match them against opponents possessing a share of the AFC East lead.  With every team in the division owning a winning record, even a Miami squad one season removed from a 1-15 record, the AFC East has become the best, most competitive division in the conference.  It’s never too early to be concerned about playoff seeding, and with just one game separating all of the teams, each divisional contest takes on added importance.

A 20-10 defeat of Buffalo at home was a great way to start this stretch off.

And what a brutally efficient display we were treated to during the 4^th quarter Sunday afternoon!  Plenty of print and bandwidth have chronicled the Patriots club record tying 19 play drive, the other occurring during a Week 2 contest against the the Jets back in 2002, but the author would be remiss as to not mention it in this weeks column.  Some other interesting facts (and notes) about this drive:

• 19 plays (Buffalo’s offense logged 43 total on the day)
• 9:08 elapsed (24 minutes real time)
• 6 clock stoppages (5 timeouts and the two minute warning)
• 19 commercials (1.0 commercial per play or CPP) for programs few of us will watch and shit we’ll likely never buy (okay, so that KFC Guitar Hero Big Box Meal is a pretty good value)

Although that drive destroyed any hope of a Bills comeback, up until that point things weren’t always peachy for the Patriot offense.  While they moved the ball well (370 yards) and continued their reinvention as a ball control offense (37:40 TOP), their 50% Red Zone efficiency (a season-long concern), a missed field goal and a lost fumble left a lot of points on the field and kept Buffalo alive much of the game.

Thus, the author agrees with Borges (this time) that the Patriot defense deserves a big share of the game ball.  Their combination of pressure and confounding coverages held the Bills to a season low 10 points.  For this week’s Turning Point, we’ll examine how manifestations of each (a sack and an interception, respectively) crippled two of Buffalo’s second half drives.

by Tyler Carter
tyler@patriotsdaily.com

By now, certain miscues have been widely cited as reasons for the Patriots’ most recent defeat:

• Gaffney’s dropped TD pass late in the 3^rd quarter
• Personal foul call on Dave Thomas
• Belichick’s ill-fated challenge/questionable use of time outs

It’s possible that these events have blown out of proportion, however.  Gaffney was only thrown to twice, having been primarily used as a run-blocking WR (and doing a damn good job at it).  The author agrees with the PD editor that the flag on Thomas was a terrible call, and it was further compounded by a non-measurement following an apparent 1^st down run by Benjarvus Green-Ellis (who from this point on shall be referred to as BGE).  As for Belichick’s allegedly reckless use of timeouts, the first was lost after someone upstairs (presumably his old buddy Ernie Adams, who he trusts implicitly) thought the 12 men on the field penalty call reversal was worth challenging, and the third was burned when New England thought they only had inches to go on 4th and 1 when the distance was actually closer to a full yard (everyone watching was treated to the soon-to-be-retired Bill Carollo’s adventures in ball spotting).

True, the Patriots would have converted had the timeout not been called, but the more pressing question is why they were afraid to go for it on 4^th down in the first place.  After all, this is the same team that does so (roughly) between the opponents 40 and 30 yard line, an arbitrary/undefined region deemed too long for a field goal and/or too short for a punt.  So why not try it on a critical Red Zone possession?

New England’s offense had no trouble moving the ball between the 20s:

Rushing: 26 carries, 118 yards, 4.54 yards per carry

Passing: 21-28, 189 yards, 1 INT, 6.75 yards per attempt

Average gain: 5.69 yards per play

Once in the Red Zone however, their production plummeted:

Rushing: 6 carries, 22 yards, 1 TD, 3.67 yards per carry (does not include failed two-point conversion)

Passing: 5-7, 13 yards, 1.86 yards per attempt

Average gain: 2.69 yards per play

by Tyler Carter
tyler@patriotsdaily.com

In front of a nationally televised audience against Denver, Matt Cassel completed 75% percent of his passes (7.7 yards per attempt), three of them for touchdowns and none for interceptions.  Although his success was no doubt buoyed by a potent rushing attack (not to mention five forced turnovers), his 136.3 passer rating was 10th highest all-time by a Patriot quarterback, and he was named AFC Offensive Player of the Week for his performance.

Yet his best game may have been against the Rams this past Sunday.

The author is aware that Cassel threw two interceptions, and his 21-33 effort (63.6%) actually brought down his seasonal completion percentage (65.8%).  The interceptions, which were primarily responsible for his lackluster 73.7 passer rating, were rather fortuitous: the first came on a pass intended for Moss (who had single coverage) that was tipped by Fakhir Brown and hauled in by Oshiomogho Atogwe, and the second occurred after Welker fell victim to the turf monster, giving Brown an easy pick.  If you take away those two picks (and assume the passes fell incomplete), Cassel’s rating jumps to a more respectable 98.9.

You can’t simply ignore turnovers however, and on this day the Rams won that battle 4-1 (if the turnover on downs and onside kick are factored in).  Although this provided the Rams with favorable field position and momentum, the Patriot defense rallied and surrendered only a couple of field goals.  The unit had a monster day overall, allowing only 16 points despite giving up 358 yards of total offense (268 through the air) for an eye-popping 22.38 yards per point allowed (YPPA, a measure of CHFF’s Bendability Index).

This week however, the Turning Point belongs to the Cassel-led offense.  After their three 3^rd quarter drives ended in turnovers (the aforementioned interceptions and turnover on downs), St. Louis led by three early in the 4^th quarter.  New England was forced to punt after their next possession before they finally got in sync on a drive that resulted in a game-tying field goal.  After their final (non-kneeldown) possession began with a sack (and brought up 2^nd and 18), the Patriots went back to their shotgun spread in an attempt to break the stalemate.

by Tyler Carter
tyler@patriotsdaily.com

A week after this columnist suggested they were on pace for their worst statistical season since 2000, the Patriots responded by recording their most decisive win of the season against AFC West-leading Denver, an organization that has historically given them fits.

Although it was certainly satisfying to watch, such a butt-kicking made it difficult to identify a turning point.  Was it the return of the hoodie?  The Pat’s wearing their home blues for the first time this season?  The author’s first-ever trip to Gillette (and all-out effort to make a 12^th man out of the country club fans in Section 214)?

The boys over at Cold, Hard Football Facts are fond of their ‘Quality Stats‘, which are so named for their having a direct correlation to winning.  Among the Quality Stats is the ‘Big Play Index‘, which ranks the teams according to Big Play differential (gained subtracting allowed).  Examples of big plays include turnovers (fumble recoveries and interceptions), long run (>25 yards) and pass (>40 yards) plays, etc.

After their first five games of 2008, the Patriots ranked a paltry 27^th in the index.  On Monday night alone, the Patriots logged as many Big Plays (eight) as they had all season:

-Two interceptions
-Three fumble recoveries
-Two Sammy Morris runs over 25 yards
-One Wes Welker punt return over 40 yards.

And these Big Plays weren’t just enjoyable to watch; the Patriots scored 34 of their 41 points off of drives resulting from or including a Big Play.  They were the difference in this ball game, and largely resulted from an opportunistic defense (five turnovers) and a terrific ground attach (largest output in 15 years).  For this week’s Turning Point, we’ll break down a play from each unit.

by Tyler Carter
tyler@patriotsdaily.com

We’re about to enter Week 7 of the NFL.  The trade deadline has passed, players on the physically unable to perform (PUP) list start to return, so by this point you generally have a good idea of what your team will look like going forward.

And New England fans, unless this group of guys turn things around, 2008 will be worst statistical season since Belichick took over in 2000.

First, a few numbers.  This table (all statistics courtesy of Pro-Football-Reference.com) compares the scoring offenses, scoring defenses and point differentials (and their associated league-wide rankings) along with how the Patriots finished for the first eight years of Bill Belichick’s tenure.

The scoring averages themselves are raw numbers that don’t mean a whole lot by themselves.  By contrast, the league rankings and point differentials are relative statistics that indicate how the Patriots stacked up against their opponents.  Some things jump out at you:

The Patriots have only thrice ranked outside the top 10 in scoring defense (2000, 2002, and 2005)

For anyone requiring a refresher of the pre-2000 Pete Carroll/Bobby Grier botchjob, I highly recommend both Chris Price’s ‘The Blueprint‘ and Michael Holley’s ‘Patriot Reign‘.

Coming off their worst-to-first championship season, the 2002 Patriots faced a much tougher schedule and fielded a slow, aging defensive roster (Bobby Hamilton and Anthony Pleasant on the defensive line, O-T-I-S, Terrell Buckley and Victor Green in the secondary).

In 2005, New England’s defense dealt with turnover in both the coaching ranks (RAC leaving for Cleveland elevated Mangina to Defensive Coordinator) as well as the roster (Ty Law’s departure, Ted Johnson’s retirement, the failed Monty Beisel/Chad Brown experiment) as well as injuries (Bruschi’s stroke, Seymour).

Despite these defensive setbacks, however, in 2002 and 2005 the Patriots boasted top 10 scoring offenses which helped propel them to 1^st place AFC East finishes.

by Tyler Carter
tyler@patriotsdaily.com

In his first year on the job, San Francisco offensive coordinator Mike Martz is transitioning the 49ers to an “Air Coryell” offense, having previously used it in St. Louis (with spectacular results) and Detroit.  The system is named for Don Coryell, who first developed the complex, pass-happy (hence the “Air” epithet) offense at San Diego State and later refined it at the pro level with the Dan Fouts-led San Diego Chargers.  Martz was first exposed to it growing up at a nearby San Diego high school, and eventually his coaching pedigree would directly link to Coryell through the latter’s disciples, particularly Ernie Zampese (whom Martz served under as wide receivers coach during his first stint with the LA Rams) and Norv Turner (coached alongside Martz in LA and brought the latter onboard as quarterbacks coach at Washington).

So what is exactly is the “Air Coryell”?  Here’s a passage from an informative archived article from the San Diego Union-Tribune:

The passing emphasis.  The use of motion.  The many “packages,” some with four receivers, some with three, some with two running backs, some with one, some with none.  How receivers’ routes are numbered, which arguably was the most ingenious aspect of Coryell’s system.

The numbering system that Martz uses is ‘identical to Coryell’s’.  The article further elaborates:

To the routes, he assigned numbers from 1 through 9.  Simply by naming a formation and reciting three numbers, a quarterback can call a pass play.  On “989,” to offer an example, the receiver on the formation’s left would run a “9,” the receiver next to him an “8,” and the receiver on the right a “9.”

Joe Theismann, who orchestrated a derivative offense under Joe Gibbs (himself a Coryell minion), explains the value of numbered passing routes:

“If you have to go out and bring in a player, this offense is so much easier than any other to learn.  In the West Coast offense, there is a lot of memorization, so if you need to fill in with a guy, it is going to take him three weeks to a month to learn the offense.  With the offense Mike runs, if a guy can count from 1 to 9 and can figure out where the tight end is, he can be ready in a week.”