Last Thursday night’s contest was full of momentum shifts.  The Jets scored on their first four possessions (one of them a kickoff return touchdown) to jump out to an early 24-6 lead.  Afterwards the Patriot defense/special teams adjusted, allowing New York nothing on their next five non-kneeldown drives.  Meanwhile, New England’s offense gradually chipped away at the deficit, finally tying the game early in the 4^th quarter.  The Jets subsequently rattled off a sustained, clock-killing drive (14 plays, 63 yards, 7:06 elapsed) that ended with a go-ahead touchdown.  The teams traded three-and-outs, with the Patriots using their time outs, the two minute warning and a stout defensive effort to give them one last shot with 1:04 remaining.  It took Cassel only 1:03 to erase any lingering doubts about his clutchness as he delivered an on-the-run game-tying TD to a perfectly-covered Moss in the corner of the end zone (time index; 4:44).  Cassel led his team on two game-tying 4^th quarter drives, although officially it only counts as one comeback.

Due to sudden death overtime rules, however, he was unable to build on it, making the eventual overtime loss all the more bitter.  Ranting about overtime invites hypocrisy given New England’s 7-0 record under Belichick & Brady (with plenty of fortunate bounces and breaks) prior to Thursday night.  And griping about rules that have been in place for 34 years may ring hollow compared to the NFL’s other glaring problems, among them horrific, consequence-free officiating and a humorless, dictatorial commissioner.  Therefore the author begs your indulgence.

This season we’ve witnessed the greatest amount of parity, Tennessee and the defending champs aside, since 2002.  Former commissioner Pete Rozelle’s dying legacy was to establish an even economic playing field, the idea being that the talent level would likewise equilibrate and give every team a chance to succeed.  What does parity have to do with overtime?  If the spirit of the former is to promote competitiveness, why not do the same for the latter by giving each team at least one possession?  Under the current archaic system, the winner of the overtime coin toss prevails 60% of the time.  In a league of parity, the stakes are too high for the outcome of games to be determined at random; as the PD editor pointed out yesterday, the overtime loss dropped the Patriots from the #3 AFC seed to being out of the playoff picture entirely.

However inconvenient the current rules, if the Patriots wanted to avoid being in that hole they certainly had their opportunities defensively in overtime.  The drive actually began well for the Patriots as they sacked Favre for a five yard loss.  On the next play, rookie Gary Guyton demonstrated his progress as a coverage linebacker by breaking up a pass intended for running back Leon Washington.  Faced with a 3^rd and long and in danger of giving the ball back to a red-hot Patriot offense, Favre used his short spread passing attack to exploit the Patriots soft zone coverage, the subject of this week’s Turning Point:

Situation: 3-15-NYJ 15 (14:19)

New York Formation: Shotgun 4 WR, Washington offset right

Personnel: WR 87 Coles, WR 83 Stuckey, LT 60 Ferguson. LG 66 Faneca, C 74 Mangold, RG 65 Moore, RT 67 Big Wood, WR/TE 81 Keller, WR 89 Cotchery, QB 4 Hero, RB 29 Washington

New England Formation: Nickel 2-4-5

Personnel: DL 97 Green, DL 93 Seymour, OLB 50 Vrabel, ILB 51 Mayo, ILB 59 Guyton, OLB 58 Woods, LCB 21 O’Neil, SS 31 Meriweather, FS 36 Sanders, NB 23 Webster, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs

Play result: B.Favre pass short middle to D.Keller to NYJ 31 for 16 yards

Play Summary: Cover 2 safeties Sanders and Meriweather visited the ISS while O’Neal and Trey Hobbs respectively lined up tight on Cotchery and Coles.  Meanwhile, Webster allowed Stuckey, who was already lined up behind the LOS, a 13 yard cushion, which Favre noted during his pre-snap reads.  He quickly changed his mind however after observing Vrabel rush off the left edge and Mayo (the left inside linebacker or LILB) drop back to the right, leaving Keller with approximately 254 square yards (a conservative estimate) of open field.  By the time Meriweather returned from orbit to deliver a jarring hit, the tight end had plenty of momentum to lean for the critical 3^rd down conversion.

Why oh why was Mayo playing on the right defensive half of the field to begin with?  His shifting there seemed premeditated in spite of the fact that Stuckey and Washington were already covered.  An absolute backbreaker.

Following a four yard run by Thomas Jones, New York came out in a two tight end set, which offers great versatility despite traditionally being categorized as a run formation.

Situation: 2-6-NYJ 35 (13:05)

New York Formation: Big Ace Twin WR, Cotchery slotted left

Personnel: WR 87 Coles, WR 89 Cotchery, TE 86 Baker, LT 60 Ferguson. LG 66 Faneca, C 74 Mangold, RG 65 Moore, RT 67 Big Wood, TE 81 Keller, QB 4 Gunslinger, RB 29 Washington

New England Formation: 3-4 Over

Personnel: LDE 99 Wright, NT 75 Wilfork, RDE 93 Seymour, OLB 58 Woods, ILB 51 Mayo, ILB 59 Guyton, OLB 50 Vrabel, LCB 21 O’Neil, SS 31 Meriweather, FS 36 Sanders, NB 23 Sanders, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs

Play result: B.Favre pass short right to D.Keller to NYJ 47 for 12 yards

Play Summary: Facing a “Big” set on 2^nd and 6, the Patriots countered with their base 3-4 personnel, with Woods and Vrabel lining up over the tight ends (Keller and Baker, respectively).  Meriweather came down to cover Cotchery in the left slot while O’Neil acted as the left Cover 2 safety.  Bruschi simulated a blitz presnap before dropping back to cover Baker.  The actual pass rush consisting of Wright, Wilfork, Seymour and Vrabel succeeded in applying pressure, but Favre rolled out right and bought himself time to once again find Keller, the latter having reached the vacated zone behind Woods (who was keyed with Washington in the flat), beside Mayo (covering the middle of the field) and underneath O’Neil.

The Patriots were determined to keep everything in front of them, and a Cover 2 zone strategy is certainly effective at taking away the deep ball.  The drawback is a lack of flexibility: as with the previously described play, Favre simply waited for a receiver to find a (gaping) hole.  And once again it was Keller, who is quickly morphing into a Mark Chmura/Bubba Franks security blanket.

The Jets gained only 12 yards over their next four plays, and faced with 2^nd and 10 on the New England 40, they needed at least one more first down to be within range of a game-winning field goal.

Situation: 2-10-NE 40 (9:43)

New York Formation: Shotgun 4 WR, Washington offset left

Personnel: WR 89 Cotchery, WR 83 Stuckey, LT 60 Ferguson. LG 66 Faneca, C 74 Mangold, RG 65 Moore, RT 67 Big Wood, WR/TE 81 Keller, WR 87 Coles, QB 4 Hero, RB 29 Washington

New England Formation: Nickel 2-4-5

Personnel: DL 97 Green, DL 93 Seymour, OLB 58 Woods, ILB 51 Mayo, ILB 59 Guyton, OLB 50 Vrabel, LCB 21 O’Neil, SS 31 Meriweather, FS 36 Sanders, NB 23 Webster, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs

Play result: B.Favre pass short middle to L.Coles to NE 24 for 16 yards

Play Summary: Washington went in motion behind Favre to the right.  As before, the Patriot pass rush (Green, Seymour and Vrabel) attacked the left side of New Yorks offensive line, prompting Favre to once again roll out right.  With Washington being covered by Guyton and Keller now being double-teamed by Woods (initially) and Mayo (jumping on the underneath route), Coles cleared O’Neal’s zone to come open in the middle.  Favre made a great on-the-run throw across his body to his #1 receiver.

At this point New England was purely reactionary; having twice been beaten Keller, Mayo overcompensated and left the middle zone vacated.  This and prior coverages proved costly, as the Jets subsequently called for three straight runs up the middle to improve positioning for Feely’s game-winning chip shot.

Conclusions/Silver Lining:

In his Week 2 Turning Point conclusions, the author was highly critical of Favre, implying that his affinity for taking risks might eventually do the Jets more harm then good.  Its possible those statements were unfairly premature, especially since at that point he’d only been with the Jets for five weeks.  Since then he’s settled in nicely, and the Jets have won six of seven largely on the strength of their 2^nd ranked scoring offense.

And although they came up short, the Patriots boasted their best total offense output in nearly 30 years, with Cassel himself having a historic day.  If New England plans to play in January however, they’ll need all three phases to play well since the margin for error is practically nil.

Tyler Carter’s ‘The Turning Point’ appears weekly on Patriots Daily. He can be reached at tyler@patriotsdaily.com.

A 20-10 defeat of Buffalo at home was a great way to start this stretch off.

And what a brutally efficient display we were treated to during the 4^th quarter Sunday afternoon!  Plenty of print and bandwidth have chronicled the Patriots club record tying 19 play drive, the other occurring during a Week 2 contest against the the Jets back in 2002, but the author would be remiss as to not mention it in this weeks column.  Some other interesting facts (and notes) about this drive:

• 19 plays (Buffalo’s offense logged 43 total on the day)
• 9:08 elapsed (24 minutes real time)
• 6 clock stoppages (5 timeouts and the two minute warning)
• 19 commercials (1.0 commercial per play or CPP) for programs few of us will watch and shit we’ll likely never buy (okay, so that KFC Guitar Hero Big Box Meal is a pretty good value)

Although that drive destroyed any hope of a Bills comeback, up until that point things weren’t always peachy for the Patriot offense.  While they moved the ball well (370 yards) and continued their reinvention as a ball control offense (37:40 TOP), their 50% Red Zone efficiency (a season-long concern), a missed field goal and a lost fumble left a lot of points on the field and kept Buffalo alive much of the game.

Thus, the author agrees with Borges (this time) that the Patriot defense deserves a big share of the game ball.  Their combination of pressure and confounding coverages held the Bills to a season low 10 points.  For this week’s Turning Point, we’ll examine how manifestations of each (a sack and an interception, respectively) crippled two of Buffalo’s second half drives.

After New England’s second half opening drive field goal extended their lead to 10, Buffalo largely abandoned their ineffective ground attack (12 1^st half carries for 36 yards and ZERO first downs), believing their greatest chance was to exploit a battered Patriot secondary.  On their first second half possession, the Bills even passed on 3^rd and 1: a typical West Coast Offense RB dumpoff that fell incomplete and forced a punt.  The 3^rd and 1 bug must have been contagious as the Patriots likewise failed in their conversion attempt, with Law Firm being stopped for a three yard loss despite a 3 TE, 2 RB goal line offense.

Edwards and company moved the ball with greater success on their next possession, which included a conversion on 3^rd and 12 and an actual rushing first down (albeit on 2^nd and 1).  Following an incomplete pass, however, their drive came to a screeching halt as the Patriot mixed things up:

Situation: 2-10-BUF 45 (:45)

Buffalo Formation: Shotgun 4 WR, Lynch offset right

Personnel: WR 83 Evans, WR 11 Parrish, LT 71 Peters, LG 66 Dockery, C 75 Preston, RG 73 Chambers, RT 68 Walker, WR/TE 84 Royal, WR 81 Hardy, QB 5 Edwards, RB 23 Lynch

New England Formation: Nickel 3-3-5

Personnel: LDE 58 Woods, NT 99 Wright, RDE 97 Green, OLB 59 Guyton, ILB 51 Mayo, OLB 50 Vrabel, LCB 21 O’Neal, SS 31 Meriweather, FS 36 Sanders, NB 23 Webster, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs

Play result: T.Edwards pass deep right intended for R.Royal INTERCEPTED by D.O’Neal at NE 39

Summary: This Patriot front could be classified as 2-4 based on personnel, but Woods clearly served as a down lineman.  After the snap however, he stayed on Lynch while Wright, Green and Vrabel rushed.  Guyton and O’Neal initially appeared to be respectively matched up on Royal and Hardy but were actually in zone coverage; thus neither followed when the former ran a corner fade route while the latter crossed underneath.  Believing Royal had found a seam in New England’s Cover 2, Edwards launched the ball to his tight end, but O’Neal settled underneath for a gorgeous leaping pick.

The Patriots were unable to capitalize and ended up giving the ball right back due to the aforementioned fumble.  The Bills subsequent drive also began promisingly, this time with three straight Marshawn Lynch runs.  The first came out of the shotgun, a draw play not unlike what the Patriots have often done with Faulk this year.  On the second rush, Buffalo operated out of the “Big” Ace, a more traditional run formation.  Despite great penetration by Seymour (who likewise did so on the previous play), Lynch broke the tackle with an ankle-splitting cutback.  The Bills once again used Ace on the third play, only this time with 3 WRs.  By using a TE (Schoumann) as the slot receiver, this gave the Bills superior blocking on the resulting outside run.  The three runs resulted in gains of 8, 7 and 5 yards respectively, giving the Bills 2^nd and 5 and their second deepest penetration of the day thus far at the New England 36:

Situation: 2-5-NE 36 (11:52)

Buffalo Formation: Shotgun 3 WR, Schouman slotted right, Jackson offset left

Personnel: WR 13 St. Johnson, TE 86 Fine, LT 71 Peters, LG 66 Dockery, C 75 Preston, RG 73 Chambers, RT 68 Walker, WR/TE 80 Schouman, WR 83 Evans, QB 5 Edwards, RB 22 Jackson

New England Formation: 3-4

Personnel: LDE 94 Warren, NT 99 Wright, RDE 93 Seymour, OLB 58 Woods, ILB 51 Mayo, ILB 54 Bruschi, OLB 50 Vrabel, LCB 21 O’Neal, SS 31 Meriweather, FS 36 Sanders, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs

Play result: T.Edwards sacked at NE 42 for -6 yards

Summary: After Lynch went to the sidelines, the Patriots went Cover 2, dropping Sanders and Meriweather deep while lining O’Neal and Trey Hobbs up tight on Evans and St. Johnson, respectively.  After the snap, the latter two ran short inward slants, Schouman ran a post and Fine headed for the left flat.  Even if one of them had managed to find a seam, which they didn’t, Edwards wouldn’t have been able to deliver as Warren bull-rushed Chambers and sent the young QB to the turf.

Lynch’s checking out of the lineup combined with the shotgun formation probably tipped the Patriots off on what the Bills planned to run.  The most critical play of the drive, it put the Bills into an even more obvious 3^rd and long situation.  The subsequent pass attempt from a 4 WR package was broken up by Mayo’s stellar coverage on Royal, forcing a punt.

Conclusions:

Here’s a summary of the Bills second half possessions: three and out, interception, punt, 1 play garbage time passing TD (set up by a long kickoff return).  In the entire second half, the Bills possessed the ball for only a paltry 7:16 and mustered just 58 total yards.

Despite mounting injuries (first Crable and now Thomas on IR, Trey Hobbs’s shoulder, Sanders’s hammy, Wheatley’s arm), the Patriots defense continues to improve and has quietly crept up to 6^th in the NFL in scoring (17.8 points per game).  They’ll need to be at their very best this Thursday night as they’ll be hosting the AFC’s highest scoring offense, led by none other than a gunslinging ‘Hero‘.

Tyler Carter’s ‘The Turning Point’ appears weekly on Patriots Daily. He can be reached at tyler@patriotsdaily.com.

By now, certain miscues have been widely cited as reasons for the Patriots’ most recent defeat:

• Gaffney’s dropped TD pass late in the 3^rd quarter
• Personal foul call on Dave Thomas
• Belichick’s ill-fated challenge/questionable use of time outs

It’s possible that these events have blown out of proportion, however.  Gaffney was only thrown to twice, having been primarily used as a run-blocking WR (and doing a damn good job at it).  The author agrees with the PD editor that the flag on Thomas was a terrible call, and it was further compounded by a non-measurement following an apparent 1^st down run by Benjarvus Green-Ellis (who from this point on shall be referred to as BGE).  As for Belichick’s allegedly reckless use of timeouts, the first was lost after someone upstairs (presumably his old buddy Ernie Adams, who he trusts implicitly) thought the 12 men on the field penalty call reversal was worth challenging, and the third was burned when New England thought they only had inches to go on 4th and 1 when the distance was actually closer to a full yard (everyone watching was treated to the soon-to-be-retired Bill Carollo’s adventures in ball spotting).

True, the Patriots would have converted had the timeout not been called, but the more pressing question is why they were afraid to go for it on 4^th down in the first place.  After all, this is the same team that does so (roughly) between the opponents 40 and 30 yard line, an arbitrary/undefined region deemed too long for a field goal and/or too short for a punt.  So why not try it on a critical Red Zone possession?

New England’s offense had no trouble moving the ball between the 20s:

Rushing: 26 carries, 118 yards, 4.54 yards per carry

Passing: 21-28, 189 yards, 1 INT, 6.75 yards per attempt

Average gain: 5.69 yards per play

Once in the Red Zone however, their production plummeted:

Rushing: 6 carries, 22 yards, 1 TD, 3.67 yards per carry (does not include failed two-point conversion)

Passing: 5-7, 13 yards, 1.86 yards per attempt

Average gain: 2.69 yards per play

Try to put yourself in Belichick’s shoes.  Your team has run a total of thirteen Red Zone plays (spread over four possessions).  Nearly half (six or 46%) of those plays resulted in no gain or negative yardage.  It’s now 4^th down early in the 4^th quarter and your team is down by three on the road against your archrivals.  Should you fail to convert, said rivals are fully capable of ripping off another long scoring drive that would widen the deficit and kill the clock.  Wouldn’t you at least consider the safe choice of tying the score by going for the field goal?

But I digress.  This isn’t the first time this year the Patriots have struggled in the Red Zone; back in Week 6 the Chargers held the Patriots to a 33% Red Zone Efficiency.  Indianapolis did an even better job Sunday night, allowing New England just one touchdown on four Red Zone visits.  The passing game (1.86 yards per attempt?!) was particularly woeful in this area, and for this weeks Turning Point, we’ll break down the three consecutive (unsuccessful) passing plays that lead to the aforementioned consolation field goal.

As was the case much of the day, Indianapolis allowed Patriots room to operate underneath.  Cassel picked apart Dungy’s Tampa 2 zone variant with short passes (none went longer than 11 yards), with a few Faulk draws mixed in for good measure.  The Patriots operated out of their shotgun formation on 10 out of 15 (66%) of their plays during the drive.  Whereas this formation gave St. Louis and Denver fits however, the flexible, speedy Colt defense was more than capable of tightening up in a short field:

Situation: 1-10-IND 16 (12:57)

New England Formation: Shotgun 4 WR (Trips Right), BGE offset left

Personnel: WR 81 Moss, LT 72 Light, LG 70 Mankins, C 67 Koppen, RG 61 Neal, RT 77 Kaczur, WR/TE 86 Thomas, WR 83 Welker, WR/TE 84 Watson, QB 16 Cassel, RB 42 BGE

Indianapolis Formation: 4-3 Over

Personnel: DE 79 Brock, LDT 68 Foster, RDT 96 Dawson, RDE 93 Freeney, SLB 55 Session, MLB 58 Brackett, WLB 56 Hagler, LCB 23 Jennings, SS 21 Sanders, FS 41 Bethea, RCB 31 Ratliff

Play result: M.Cassel pass incomplete short left to BGE

Summary: Perhaps wary of another draw play (not out of the question facing two tight ends in this personnel grouping), the Colts countered with their base 4-3.  The Trips Right bunch included (outside to inside), Watson, Welker and Thomas; on the ensuing snap they ran a curl, a square in and a fade, respectively.  While Session initially appeared responsible for Welker, he and Brackett dropped back into zone coverage to take away the middle of the field, leaving BGE underneath as Cassel’s only option.  By the time he began his throw however, Brock had overpowered Kaczur to hurry the young quarterback into underthrowing his running back.

The author couldn’t determine why Mathis sat out on this play, but it didn’t seem to matter; the undersized Brock powered his way through Kaczur to help force the incomplete and put the Patriots in an obvious passing situation on 2^nd and long:

Situation: 2-10-IND 16 (12:51)

New England Formation: Shotgun 4 WR (Trips Left), Faulk offset right

Substitutions: WR 10 Gaffney in for Thomas, RB 33 Faulk in for BGE

Indianapolis Formation: Nickel 4-2-5

Substitutions: DE 98 Mathis in for Foster, S 33 Bullitt in for Session

Play result: M.Cassel pass short right to W.Welker to IND 17 for -1 yards

Summary: Welker interrupted the Trips Left by going in motion left to right presnap; as he did so he was abandoned by Bethea and picked up by Sanders.  Also on the defensive side, Brock shifted back to LDT upon Mathis’ return.  Cassel faked the draw handoff to Faulk (freezing Brackett and Bethea) before quickly dumping the ball to Welker on a screen pass.  He was unable to go anywhere however, as Mathis (who recovered from Kaczur’s initial block), and Hagler (who sped past Neal) shared credit on the tackle for a loss.

While the WR screen worked well against a patchwork Denver unit and a St. Louis squad in prevent mode, the Colts have far too much speed on defense for this play to work.  Mathis’ terrific second effort wasn’t even needed, as Hagler was there to wrap up with Sanders closing in.  On the subsequent 3^rd and long situation the Colts were allowed to tighten up even further by using their dime package:

Situation: 3-11-IND 17 (12:13)

New England Formation: Shotgun 3 WR, Moss slotted left, Faulk offset left

Substitutions: None

Indianapolis Formation: Dime 4-1-6

Substitutions: S 43 Giordano in for Hagler

Play result: M.Cassel pass short middle to W.Welker to IND 7 for 10 yards

Summary: On this shotgun variant Moss made a rare appearance as slot receiver while on the opposite side Welker went in motion from a wide to a tight position.  After the snap, Jennings dropped back to join Sanders and Giordano for a Cover 3 look, while Bullitt stayed over the top of Welker.  The latter was Cassel’s first and only read, and the QB hit him on a short slant pattern that came up just short (how short, only Bill Carollo knows).

While six defensive backs may seem like overkill when faced with only three wide receivers, the Colts were determined to not allow the Patriots to convert.  Mission accomplished.

Situation: 4-1-IND 7…

Never mind; too damned painful to relive!

Conclusions:

Bill Belichick said it best in his Monday afternoon press conference:

“We need to take better advantage of our scoring [chances].  Any one of those plays [in the red zone] would have made the difference in the game…It comes down to better execution.  It’s harder to throw down there…[and] it’s harder to run because there’s less space to defend.  We just have to do a better job of getting it in and we have to do a better job of keeping them out.”

In front of a nationally televised audience against Denver, Matt Cassel completed 75% percent of his passes (7.7 yards per attempt), three of them for touchdowns and none for interceptions.  Although his success was no doubt buoyed by a potent rushing attack (not to mention five forced turnovers), his 136.3 passer rating was 10th highest all-time by a Patriot quarterback, and he was named AFC Offensive Player of the Week for his performance.

Yet his best game may have been against the Rams this past Sunday.

The author is aware that Cassel threw two interceptions, and his 21-33 effort (63.6%) actually brought down his seasonal completion percentage (65.8%).  The interceptions, which were primarily responsible for his lackluster 73.7 passer rating, were rather fortuitous: the first came on a pass intended for Moss (who had single coverage) that was tipped by Fakhir Brown and hauled in by Oshiomogho Atogwe, and the second occurred after Welker fell victim to the turf monster, giving Brown an easy pick.  If you take away those two picks (and assume the passes fell incomplete), Cassel’s rating jumps to a more respectable 98.9.

You can’t simply ignore turnovers however, and on this day the Rams won that battle 4-1 (if the turnover on downs and onside kick are factored in).  Although this provided the Rams with favorable field position and momentum, the Patriot defense rallied and surrendered only a couple of field goals.  The unit had a monster day overall, allowing only 16 points despite giving up 358 yards of total offense (268 through the air) for an eye-popping 22.38 yards per point allowed (YPPA, a measure of CHFF’s Bendability Index).

This week however, the Turning Point belongs to the Cassel-led offense.  After their three 3^rd quarter drives ended in turnovers (the aforementioned interceptions and turnover on downs), St. Louis led by three early in the 4^th quarter.  New England was forced to punt after their next possession before they finally got in sync on a drive that resulted in a game-tying field goal.  After their final (non-kneeldown) possession began with a sack (and brought up 2^nd and 18), the Patriots went back to their shotgun spread in an attempt to break the stalemate.

Situation: 2-18-NE 39 (6:44)

New England Formation: Shotgun 4 WR (Trips Right), Faulk offset left

Personnel: WR 81 Moss, LT 72 Light. LT 70 Mankins, C 67 Koppen, RG 74 Neal, RT 64 LeVoir, TE 84 Watson, TE 86 Thomas, WR 83 Welker, QB 16 Cassel, RB 33 Faulk

St. Louis Formation: Nickel 4-2-5

Personnel: LDE 94 Adeyanju, LDT 97 Glover, RDT 95 Ryan, RDE 72 Long, MLB 51 Witherspoon, WLB 50 Tinoisamoa, LCB 24 Bartell, NB 31 Craft, SS 25 Chavous, FS 21 Atogwe, RCB 34 Brown

Play result: M.Cassel pass short middle to R.Moss to SL 38 for 23 yards

Play Summary: Bartell, Craft and Witherspoon respectively covered New England’s Trips Right bunch of Gaffney, Welker and Watson (outside to inside), while Brown and Tinoisamoa were responsible for Moss and Faulk on the other side.  St. Louis was apparently in Cover 2 for most of the drive; in many instances safeties Atogwe and Brown were so deep they were outside the HD frame (pre-snap).  The Rams mixed up their pass rush by crossing up Long and Ryan, but Adeyanju provided the greatest pressure as his outside move on LeVoir allowed him to come within a whiff of his own sack.  Sensing the pressure, Cassel stepped up in the pocket and fired to Moss, who after receiving the ball at the St. Louis 47 tacked on another 9 yards (thanks to Welker’s crackback block on Atogwe) before falling to the ground.

Terrific way to bounce back after a sack which could have potentially crippled this drive.  Although Moss earlier failed to break up Brown’s tipped pass (which resulted in Cassel’s first interception) and he dropped another that appeared to be an easy touchdown (for him), his yeomanlike 7 catches for 102 yards were indicative of his willingness to serve as a possession receiver.

Situation: 1-10-SL 38 (5:57)

New England Formation: Shotgun 3 WR, Welker slotted left, Faulk offset left

St. Louis Formation: Same

Play result: M.Cassel pass short left to R.Moss to SL 35 for 3 yards

Play Summary: On this shotgun variant, Welker was now slotted left while Watson lined up in his traditional TE spot.  Cassel’s fake-handoff to Faulk froze the St. Louis lineman and linebackers, and the quarterback quickly threw across to Moss on a WR screen.  While Brown was held off by Welker, nickelback John Craft watched Cassel the whole way and wrapped up Moss before Light could get over to help spring him.

As the color commentator (J.C. Pearson) alertly pointed out, the Patriots ran this exact same play against Denver the week before, and on that occasion it went for a touchdown; apparently St. Louis  does their homework!  Although Brown initially gave Moss enough of a cushion (~7 yards) to allow a screen to develop, a Craft-y veteran (pardon the pun) had it sniffed it from the get-go.  Still, three yards on a drive with a dual goal of killing clock and putting up a go-ahead score wasn’t a terrible result.

Situation: 2-7-SL 35 (5:19)

New England Formation: Shotgun 3 WR, Welker slotted right, Faulk offset left

St. Louis Formation: Same

Play result: K.Faulk right guard to SL 28 for 7 yards

Play Summary: Each Patriot skill position player (excluding Faulk) swapped sides of the field (Gaffney and Watson to Cassel’s left, Welker and Moss to the right).  The Ram corners lined up nearly flush with the linebackers, giving the Patriot wideouts at least 5 yards off their respective receivers (moreso for Gaffney and Welker, who respectively acted as flanker and slot receivers).  After receiving the handoff from Cassel, Faulk sidestepped Ryan (who got penetration against Koppen) and squirted through the hole provided by Neil (matched up on Adeyanju), LeVoir (who sealed off Witherspoon after initially helping Neil) and Welker (held off Craft before the latter made yet another tackle).

It’s worth pointing out here that St. Louis was in pure reactionary mode on this drive; apparently they were confident that their base nickel package gave them the greatest flexibility to prevent a New England score.  The Patriots clearly had them guessing, however; on this play the linebackers and corners played so far off the LOS that they must not have been anticipating a run call.  This resulted in favorable blocking and provided Faulk with room to maneuver.

Situation: 1-10-SL 28 (4:41)

New England Formation: Ace 3 WR, Welker slotted left

St. Louis Formation: Same

Play result: M.Cassel pass short right to R.Moss to SL 20 for 8 yards

Play Summary: In response to the Patriots first (and only) non-shotgun formation on the drive, the Rams lined their corners on the LOS tight and brought Chavous down from his SS spot to shadow Watson.  After taking the snap, Cassel pumped once and fired to Moss, who positioned himself inside Bartell and made the catch for an 8 yard gain.

As with the previous play, the Patriots appeared to have the Rams fooled, only this time they had them thinking run by adopting a more ‘traditional’ 1^st down formation.  This appeared to be a timing route designed for Moss the whole way; after taking the snap Cassel stared down Witherspoon (who was either serving as ‘spy’ or covering the middle zone) before tossing it to Moss; he made no other reads on the play.  Nothing fancy, just a quick slant.

After returning to a shotgun 3 WR set, Faulk picked up 5 yards and a first down on a run up the middle.  This gave New England 1^st and 10 from the 15 yard line:

Situation: 1-10-SL 15 (3:19)

New England Formation: Shotgun 3 WR, Welker slotted left, Faulk offset right

St. Louis Formation: Same

Play result: M.Cassel pass short left to K.Faulk for 15 yards, TOUCHDOWN

Play Summary: Faulk split out left to empty the backfield for effectively a 5 WR formation; Tinoisamoa responded by moving over to his side (albeit 6 yards off the LOS, and slightly to the inside).  Cassel noted the mismatch and Tinoisamoa’s positioning as went through his pre-snap rituals (pointing out the MLB, etc.).  After the snap, Faulk ran a slant-and-go route (shake and bake!), and Cassel pump-faked once before floating a perfect ball over the linebacker right into his running back’s basket for the go-ahead score.

While Cassel made a terrific throw, Faulk deserves the majority of credit for his execution.  In the locker room after the game, Heath Evans commented on Faulk’s value to the team:

“If you’re going to put it in one person’s hands it might as well be his. When it comes down to pressure situations and someone that’s done it for 10 years one way with great consistency, who else’s hands would you want it in? This guy does it all, pass protection, catches a tough ball, picks up blitzers that are 50 pounds heavier than him, he’s the best.”

Conclusions:

Although the game was frustrating to watch at times from a fans perspective, there were a lot of positives to take away from it: the defense bent-but-didn’t-break, and despite being without its top three running backs the Patriots managed a balanced offensive attack (29 rushes, 33 passes).  What’s more, Cassel’s first 4^th quarter comeback demonstrates his continued progression.  We’ll see how far the Patriots have come when they take their impressive 5-2 into Indy on Sunday night.

A week after this columnist suggested they were on pace for their worst statistical season since 2000, the Patriots responded by recording their most decisive win of the season against AFC West-leading Denver, an organization that has historically given them fits.

Although it was certainly satisfying to watch, such a butt-kicking made it difficult to identify a turning point.  Was it the return of the hoodie?  The Pat’s wearing their home blues for the first time this season?  The author’s first-ever trip to Gillette (and all-out effort to make a 12^th man out of the country club fans in Section 214)?

The boys over at Cold, Hard Football Facts are fond of their ‘Quality Stats‘, which are so named for their having a direct correlation to winning.  Among the Quality Stats is the ‘Big Play Index‘, which ranks the teams according to Big Play differential (gained subtracting allowed).  Examples of big plays include turnovers (fumble recoveries and interceptions), long run (>25 yards) and pass (>40 yards) plays, etc.

After their first five games of 2008, the Patriots ranked a paltry 27^th in the index.  On Monday night alone, the Patriots logged as many Big Plays (eight) as they had all season:

-Two interceptions
-Three fumble recoveries
-Two Sammy Morris runs over 25 yards
-One Wes Welker punt return over 40 yards.

And these Big Plays weren’t just enjoyable to watch; the Patriots scored 34 of their 41 points off of drives resulting from or including a Big Play.  They were the difference in this ball game, and largely resulted from an opportunistic defense (five turnovers) and a terrific ground attach (largest output in 15 years).  For this week’s Turning Point, we’ll break down a play from each unit.

Denver’s opening possession began promisingly as they drove 41 yards in 12 plays (converting three 3^rd down attempts) and taking over 6 minutes off the clock.  They managed this despite Jay Cutler injuring his right index finger (throwing hand) on the first play from scrimmage and thus having to heavily rely on the running game (2:1 run-to-pass ratio).  On their fourth 3^rd down situation, the Broncos attempted to spread out the Patriot defense with a 4 WR formation:

Situation: 3-5-NE 32 (8:57)

Denver Formation: Shotgun Trips Right, Hall offset right

Personnel: WR 15 Marshall, LT 78 Clady, LG 50 Hamilton, C 62 Wiegmann, RG 73 Kuper, RT 74 Harris, TE/WR 89 Graham, 19 WR Royal, WR 82 Jackson, QB 6 Cutler, RB 23 Hall

New England Formation: Dime 3-2-6

Personnel: LDE 99 Wright. NT 93 Seymour, RDE 90 Smith, LOLB 96 Thomas, SS/MLB 37 Harrison, ROLB 59 Guyton, LCB 21 O’Neil, NB 29 Sanders, RCB Trey Hobbs, SS 31 Meriweather, FS 36 Sanders.

Play result: A.Hall right end to NE 30 for 2 yards (L.Sanders).  FUMBLES (L.Sanders),

RECOVERED by NE-L.Smith at NE 32. L.Smith to NE 32.

Play Summary: Thomas and Guyton (normally an inside LB) flanked the defensive line while O’Neil, Sanders and Hobbs lined up opposite Jackson, Royal and Marshall, respectively.  In this dime package Harrison acted as the middle linebacker, staying with old friend Dan Graham as the latter went in motion.  After receiving Cutler’s toss, Hall headed to the outside where Thomas and Sanders, having shrugged off blocks by Royal and Harris (the latter’s did nothing to dispel Denver’s chop blocking reputation), closed in.  As Hall turned the corner to lunge for the sticks, Sanders reached around his back to pry the ball loose.  Le Kevin Smith, who started the play as the RDE, came all the way around to pounce on the ball and halt Denver’s initial drive.

Mike Shanahan, a member of the Bill Walsh coaching tree, favors a run-heavy variant of the West Coast offense.  Behind undersized yet powerful offensive lines, mid-late round running backs such as Terrell Davis, Mike Anderson, Olandis Gary, Reuben Droughns, and Tatum Bell have each logged 1000 yard rushing seasons for the Broncos over the last ten seasons (with Davis rushing for over 2000 yards back in 1998).  This season however has been one of flux for Denver’s running back corps: due to Travis Henry’s one-year suspension and Selvin Young’s injury, the Broncos primary ball carrier Monday night was journeyman Michael Pittman.  When he sat out a few plays to nurse an injury of his own, it fell to Andre Hall, a return specialist, to carry the load.

Although they came out in the dime package, the Patriots seemed wary of a run call (having been subjected to it throughout the drive).  With six defensive backs on the field they had plenty of speed to contain an outside rush, and Sander’s savvy reach-around strip was followed by a terrific individual effort by Le Kevin Smith (who, playing behind Seymour at RDE, doesn’t get a lot of opportunities).  Denver’s next drive would likewise be derailed by a Hall fumble.

However, despite twice inheriting great field position off of turnovers, the Patriot offense settled for field goals.  On their next possession New England advanced the ball to the Denver 42 before two Matt Cassel sacks forced them to punt.  After the defense forced a Denver three-and-out, the Patriots took over at their own 44, and a Moss catch (his first) got them back into Denver territory.  On this day, however, it was the Patriots rushing attack that took center stage, and their longest run was about to come:

Situation: 2-1-DEN 47 (9:36)

New England Formation: Big I

Personnel: WR 81 Moss LT 72 Light, LG 70 Mankins, C 67 Koppen, RG 61 Neal (good to have him back), RT 64 LeVoir, TE 84 Watson, TE/H-back 86 Thomas, QB 16 Cassel, FB 44 Evans, RB 34 Morris

Denver Formation: 3-4

Personnel: LDE 91 Ekuban, NT 79 Thomas, RDE 94 Moss, LOLB 51 Winborn, LILB 55 Williams, RILB 58 Webster, ROLB 52 Green, LCB 24 Bailey, RCB 32 Bly, SS 33 Manuel, FS 37 Lowry

Play result: S.Morris up the middle to DEN 13 for 34 yards

Play Summary: Faced with a 2 TE, 2 RB formation, Denver anticipated a run call and countered with nine men in the box (Manuel came down from his strong safety spot to line up opposite Watson, and Bly followed Thomas as the latter went in motion pre-snap).  While Evans headed between the Koppen-Neal gap, Morris witnessed a monster hole develop from Light’s manhandling of Moss (which additionally sealed off Webster) and headed in that direction.  After zigzagging past Bly, Green and Lowry (the latter two collided with eachother), Morris cut to the outside to follow Moss’s downfield block.  By the time Bly finally decided to make the tackle, Morris had busted off a 34 yard gain to give the Patriots 1^st and 10 at the Denver 13.

A combination of blocking (Light, Thomas and Moss on Moss, Green and Bailey, respectively), moves/vision by Morris, and piss-poor pursuit angles by Denver made this gain possible.  It is worth noting that the Broncos injury situation (Richardson and Boss Bailey were out) forced Thomas and Green to play out of their normal positions.  Still, Moss was no match for Light, and Bly badly overran Morris when a diving stop may have limited the damage Denver suffered on the play.

The Patriots would score four plays later on 4^th and 1 (compare this to last week when they failed to score on four consecutive plays from the one yard line).  Despite going 0-5 on third down in the first half and allowing 6 sacks, the Patriots demonstrated marked improvement in the Red Zone (80% efficiency) while rushing for a blistering 6.8 YPC.

Conclusions:

Should we temper our optimism considering Denver’s injuries (Cutler, the Bailey boys, most of their receiving corps), sputtering offense (<15 PPG over their last four games, 5 turnovers on Monday night alone), and overall lack of discipline (8 accepted penalties for a crippling 85 yards)?  Perhaps, but the Patriots had a lot to do with Denver’s struggles.  With an inspired and possibly resurgent St. Louis team coming to town next week, the Patriots will have a chance to build on their success and prove that Monday night was no fluke.

We’re about to enter Week 7 of the NFL.  The trade deadline has passed, players on the physically unable to perform (PUP) list start to return, so by this point you generally have a good idea of what your team will look like going forward.

And New England fans, unless this group of guys turn things around, 2008 will be worst statistical season since Belichick took over in 2000.

First, a few numbers.  This table (all statistics courtesy of Pro-Football-Reference.com) compares the scoring offenses, scoring defenses and point differentials (and their associated league-wide rankings) along with how the Patriots finished for the first eight years of Bill Belichick’s tenure.

The scoring averages themselves are raw numbers that don’t mean a whole lot by themselves.  By contrast, the league rankings and point differentials are relative statistics that indicate how the Patriots stacked up against their opponents.  Some things jump out at you:

The Patriots have only thrice ranked outside the top 10 in scoring defense (2000, 2002, and 2005)

For anyone requiring a refresher of the pre-2000 Pete Carroll/Bobby Grier botchjob, I highly recommend both Chris Price’s ‘The Blueprint‘ and Michael Holley’s ‘Patriot Reign‘.

Coming off their worst-to-first championship season, the 2002 Patriots faced a much tougher schedule and fielded a slow, aging defensive roster (Bobby Hamilton and Anthony Pleasant on the defensive line, O-T-I-S, Terrell Buckley and Victor Green in the secondary).

In 2005, New England’s defense dealt with turnover in both the coaching ranks (RAC leaving for Cleveland elevated Mangina to Defensive Coordinator) as well as the roster (Ty Law’s departure, Ted Johnson’s retirement, the failed Monty Beisel/Chad Brown experiment) as well as injuries (Bruschi’s stroke, Seymour).

Despite these defensive setbacks, however, in 2002 and 2005 the Patriots boasted top 10 scoring offenses which helped propel them to 1^st place AFC East finishes.

The Patriots have only twice finished outside the top 10 in scoring offense (2000 and 2003)

Again, 2000 needs no explanation.

In 2003 the Patriot offense didn’t finish too far outside the top 10 but were criticized for their inability to run the ball consistently: an aging Antoine Smith split carries with Kevin Faulk, while Fred McCrary went down with injury, depriving the team of a true blocking fullback (Larry Centers and Patrick Pass were primarily used as receivers).

As the offense did in 2002 and 2005 however, the 2003 Patriot ‘Homeland Defense’ (coined by nose tackle Ted Washington) rose to the occasion, leading the league in scoring defense and setting NFL records for home shutouts (three) and points allowed at home (in a 16 game season).

This suggests that in seasons when one unit of the team ‘struggled’ (arbitrarily defined as finishing outside the top-10 in scoring), the other unit compensated.  Even when the team finished middle of the pack in terms of point differential (14^th in 2002 and 2005), they still managed 1^st place seasons.

Which brings us to the 2008 season.  For the first time since Belichick’s first season, the Patriots are on pace to finish outside the top 10 in both scoring offense and scoring defense.

Yowza.

While the defense started 2008 off strong, averaging 10 PPG against Kansas City and the NYJ, they’ve since surrendered 89 combined points to Miami, San Francisco and Miami.  Even still, this unit just barely ranks outside the top 10 in scoring defense.

The offense, however, has been inconsistent all year.  They’ve topped 20 points only once (Week 5 against San Francisco) and have scored just 8 touchdowns in 5 games.  It’s not as if they can’t move the ball; despite their ranking 21^st in total yardage, they’ve been able to drive into the opponent’s Red Zone on 15 separate occasions.  Unfortunately, they’ve only come away with touchdowns on 7 of those attempts (an unacceptable 47% efficiency).

This problem was magnified in the most recent contest at San Diego.  On their opening drive of the 3^rd quarter, New England moved the ball 77 yards in 8 plays, capped off by a tough, spirited Sammy Morris catch-and-run to set up first and goal at the 1.  A Patriot touchdown would have cut the Chargers lead to a touchdown and possibly altered the complexion of the game.  Despite four consecutive attempts, however, the Patriots turned the ball over on downs, resulting in this week’s The Turning Point.

Let’s break down how the Patriots failed to score:

Situation: 1-1-SD 1 (10:04)

New England Formation: Goal Line, Thomas H-back right, Evans offset right

Personnel: TE 50 Vrabel, LT 72 Light, LG 70 Mankins, C 67 Koppen, RG 74 Yates, RT 64 LeVoir, TE 84 Watson, TE/H-Back 86 Thomas, QB 16 Cassel, FB 44 Evans, RB 34 Morris

San Diego Formation: Goal Line

Personnel: DE 93 Castillo, DT 97 Bingham, DT 76 Williams, DE 99 Olshansky, OLB 95 Phillips, SS 42 Hart, ILB 51 Dobbins, ILB 59 Siler, ILB 54 Cooper, LCB 23 Jammer, FS 32 Weddle

Play result: M.Cassel pass incomplete short left

Summary: San Diego countered New England’s 3 TE, 2 RB set with 4 lineman and 4 linebackers.  Hart and Phillips lined up opposite Thomas (the H-back) and Vrabel, respectively.  Evans slammed off tackle with Morris leaping behind while the Chargers plugged their gaps…but it was play action!  Following his initial chip on Phillips, Vrabel released into the flat, but the former stood directly in between him and his quarterback.  With both Phillips and Castillo closing in, and no other option to throw to, Cassel wisely threw the ball to the end zone cameramen.

The Patriots went with, what had historically been for them a highly successful play call.  As many of you are aware, each of Mike Vrabel’s ten career receptions have gone for touchdowns, and all of them have come as a goal line TE.  For an offense struggling to consistently score points, this wasn’t a bad one to call, especially given it’s success rate.  And for the most part it was executed well; EVERYONE on San Diego bit, including the three ILBs (Dobbins, Siler and Cooper…terrific football names BTW).  A bit of bad luck as Phillips was right in Cassel’s passing lane and even leaped to so as to deflect any potential lob/touch pass.

Situation: 2-1-SD 1 (9:58)

New England Formation: Ditto

Personnel: Ditto

San Diego Formation: Ditto

Personnel: Ditto

Play result: S.Morris right tackle to SD 1 for no gain

Summary: No, I haven’t been watching reruns of Ghost, the personnel groupings and lineups were exactly the same.  So too was how the action unfolded: imagine that Cassel had actually handed off to Morris on the previous play.  Now picture Williams shoving Koppen two yards into the backfield to impede Morris’ progress.  Tripped up by his own center, the beleaguered halfback could do nothing but fall forward for no gain.

Since Koppen struggled against Williams all day, wouldn’t it have been prudent to give him some help, especially on a run call on a critical goal line situation?  Since the play was designed to run off right tackle, Yates assisted LeVoir with a double-team of Bingham by design.  That leaves Mankins, who was matched up on Olshansky much of the day.  If the Patriots slid the left half of their protection right, this play might have stood a better chance or succeeding.

Situation: 3-1-SD 1 (9:19)

New England Formation: Goal Line, Thomas H-back left, Evans offset left

Personnel: same

San Diego Formation: same

Personnel: same

Play result: M.Cassel pass incomplete short middle to S.Morris

Summary: Pre-snap activity on the play: Thomas went in motion left-to-right followed by Morris splitting out left, with the Charger’s ILBs and DBs barely budging in response.  On the ensuing snap, Morris, Vrabel and Evans ran pass patterns (a curl, a fade and a flat, respectively).  Cassel took a three step drop before firing a pass to Morris, but it was too low and behind for the running back to make a play.

Vrabel took Cooper with him to the back of the end zone while Weddle covered Evans.  This call was intended for Morris from the getgo; after crossing with Vrabel he had a window of opportunity against the nearest defender (Cooper) a few yards away.  Cassel wasn’t particularly pressured (although Phillips managed a decent angle against Light), but appeared to rush his throw, and it landed incomplete to bring up 4^th down.

Situation: 4-1-SD 1 (10:04)

New England Formation: Goal Line, Thomas H-back right, Evans offset right

Personnel: same

San Diego Formation: Goal Line

Personnel: same

Play result: M.Cassel sacked at SD 2 for -1 yards

Summary: After sniffing out this play action, six Charger defenders dropped into coverage.  The offensive line provided more than enough pass protection, but after a quick scan Cassel decided to pull the ball down and run with it.  After clumsily tripping over Yates (entangled on the ground with Bingham), San Diego swarmed in to force a Patriot turnover on downs

Cassel insisted he went through his reads and didn’t see Watson come open, but he didn’t even appear to look in the latter’s direction until he started scrambling.  Even then, he still had time and room to get a pass off.  Bottom line, he was either too impatient or too emboldened by his ability to run the football, and it cost his team a touchdown.

Conclusions:

While New England has had plenty of Red Zone opportunities, it has failed to convert on the majority of the time.  On this occasion they had first and goal at the 1, and as Al Michaels pointed out this was the first time since 2003 they failed to score.  While 3 pass attempts (two off play action) during this sequence were tough to fathom from a fans perspective, its understandable that the Patriots would want to give their passing offense a chance to succeed under these circumstances.  Whatever areas the Patriots feel they need to shore up, they had better do so quickly, otherwise they’re headed for a disappointing 2008 finish.

In his first year on the job, San Francisco offensive coordinator Mike Martz is transitioning the 49ers to an “Air Coryell” offense, having previously used it in St. Louis (with spectacular results) and Detroit.  The system is named for Don Coryell, who first developed the complex, pass-happy (hence the “Air” epithet) offense at San Diego State and later refined it at the pro level with the Dan Fouts-led San Diego Chargers.  Martz was first exposed to it growing up at a nearby San Diego high school, and eventually his coaching pedigree would directly link to Coryell through the latter’s disciples, particularly Ernie Zampese (whom Martz served under as wide receivers coach during his first stint with the LA Rams) and Norv Turner (coached alongside Martz in LA and brought the latter onboard as quarterbacks coach at Washington).

So what is exactly is the “Air Coryell”?  Here’s a passage from an informative archived article from the San Diego Union-Tribune:

The passing emphasis.  The use of motion.  The many “packages,” some with four receivers, some with three, some with two running backs, some with one, some with none.  How receivers’ routes are numbered, which arguably was the most ingenious aspect of Coryell’s system.

The numbering system that Martz uses is ‘identical to Coryell’s’.  The article further elaborates:

To the routes, he assigned numbers from 1 through 9.  Simply by naming a formation and reciting three numbers, a quarterback can call a pass play.  On “989,” to offer an example, the receiver on the formation’s left would run a “9,” the receiver next to him an “8,” and the receiver on the right a “9.”

Joe Theismann, who orchestrated a derivative offense under Joe Gibbs (himself a Coryell minion), explains the value of numbered passing routes:

“If you have to go out and bring in a player, this offense is so much easier than any other to learn.  In the West Coast offense, there is a lot of memorization, so if you need to fill in with a guy, it is going to take him three weeks to a month to learn the offense.  With the offense Mike runs, if a guy can count from 1 to 9 and can figure out where the tight end is, he can be ready in a week.”

In light of his young (albeit talented) roster, 49er head coach Mike Nolan may have brought Martz and his “Air Coryell” on board for its simplicity alone; how fortunate for San Francisco that Detroit saw fit to can him (which isn’t exactly a resume-killer given the historical ineptitude of his concurrent GM, but I digress).  However this numbering system may facilitate his players assimilation of the playbook, Martz, a Civil War buff with ancestral ties to the Battle of Antietam, values this offense for strategic purposes.  Here’s an excerpt from Micheal Holley’s Patriot Reign:

“The Union Army was convinced that the Confederacy was twice the size it actually was,” he told the Detroit News. “A lot of it had to do with the movement of the troops and where they were attacking.  Deception is certainly some of what we do.  It keeps people back on their heels and gives us probably a little more credit for what we are.”

In an ideal Martz “Air Coryell” variant, the receivers can run a myriad combination of routes from a single formation.  Throw in multiple personnel groupings and motions and this can quickly become a nightmare for an opposing defense.  So how does a defensive-minded coach limit all the possibilities of this style of offense?  Here’s a snippet from Bill Belichick’s Monday morning press conference:

The bottom line was we were able to do a combination of things.  One was get ahead in the game and two [was] do a decent job against the running game.  Those two factors helped to push it toward a passing game and more of a one-dimensional game.  So we really only defended one thing and that helped us on third down and on fourth quarter, two minute situations.

Sound familiar?  It should, seeing as this was Belichick’s overall defensive strategy in Super Bowl XXXVI (the defensive game plan for which is in the Hall of Fame).  Later on in Patriot Reign, Holley explains how Marshall Faulk, one of the great all-around running backs in NFL history, was the linchpin to the Rams operation.  By chipping him with a lineman or linebacker while likewise being physical with the receivers, the Patriots disrupted St. Louis’s precisely timed route running such that the latter thrice turned the ball over and managed only 3 points entering the 4^th quarter of that contest.

Needless to say, these 49ers aren’t at the level of the 2001 Rams.  But by getting ahead and stopping the run, the Patriots were able to limit the Rams offensive effectiveness for much of the 2^nd and 3^rd quarter.  In this week’s Turning Point, we’ll break down how the Patriot defense got off the field on three of those 3^rd down situations:

After allowing a go-ahead touchdown ten minutes into the first quarter, New England managed a couple of first downs before stalling at midfield.  Although the ensuing punt landed for a touchback, a 49′ers false start penalty put them in a 1^st and 15 hole, leading to the following 3^rd and long situation:

Situation: 3-9-SF 21 (15:00)

San Francisco Formation: Ace 3 WR, Bruce slotted right

Personnel: WR 83 Battle, TE 85 Davis, LT 74 Staley, LG 68 Snyder, C 66 Heitmann, RG 69 Wragge, RT 65 Sims, WR 88 Bruce, WR 82 Johnson, QB 14 O’Sullivan, RB 21 Gore

New England Formation: Dime 1-4-6

Personnel: DL 97 Green, LOLB 50 Vrabel, LILB 59 Guyton, RILB 96 Thomas, ROLB/DL 58 Woods, CB 21 O’Neil, CB 24 Wilhite, S 36 Sanders, S 37 Harrison, S 31 Meriweather, CB 27 Hobbs

Play result: J.O’Sullivan pass incomplete deep right to I.Bruce.

Summary: Woods lined up as a down lineman next to Green for what was essentially a 2-3 front, but still a dime package (six defensive backs) nonetheless.  Prior to the snap, Thomas shifted around Woods to the outside while Meriweather (playing ‘situational safety’ as Gasper put it in this morning’s piece), started up near the linebackers (apparently shading Davis) but backed up a step or two.  On the 49er side, Johnson ran an underneath pattern (matched up against O’Neil) while Bruce and Battle both ran deep patterns against Hobbs and Wilhite, respectively.  Guyton appeared responsible for Gore, who initially stayed home as a pass-blocker before entering check down mode.  While O’Sullivan wasn’t particularly pressured, the coverage was tight with the exception of Bruce, who broke to the sideline.  O’Sullivan’s timing was slightly off however, and the underthrown pass went through Bruce’s  outstretched fingertips.

3^rd and long + 3 wide receivers = extra (six) defensive backs.  Pretty simple math!  While this play won’t show up on any highlight reels, and a better-timed pass to Bruce might have gone for a first down, the Patriots nevertheless limited O’Sullivan’s options, and featured two rookies (Guyton and Wilhite) in doing so.

After the Rams punted, the Patriots gave the ball right back on a deep interception (another bomb intended for Moss).  On 3^rd and 5 from their own 11, the 49ers came out in another Ace 3 WR formation using the same personnel, only positioned differently.  And while the success of Martz’s offense relies on deception, so do the defensive schemes of his opponent:

Situation: 3-5-SF 11 (11:55)

San Francisco Formation: Ace 3 WR, Johnson slotted right

Personnel: WR 88 Bruce, LT 74 Staley, LG 68 Snyder, C 66 Heitmann, RG 69 Wragge, RT 65 Sims, TE 85 Davis, WR 82 Johnson, WR 83 Battle, QB 14 O’Sullivan, RB 21 Gore

New England Formation: Dime 1-4-6

Personnel: DL 97 Green, LOLB 50 Vrabel, LILB 59 Guyton, RILB 96 Thomas, ROLB/DL 58 Woods, CB 21 O’Neil, CB 24 Wilhite, S 36 Sanders, S 37 Harrison, S 31 Meriweather, CB 27 Hobbs

Play result: J.O’Sullivan pass incomplete deep left to I.Bruce.

Summary: Green and Woods once again assumed 3 point stances flanked by Vrabel and Thomas, but this time Guyton, Meriweather and Harrison joined them at the line.  Though this gave the appearance of a sellout blitz, Guyton and Thomas dropped back into coverage after the snap, and since San Francisco had most of its pass blocking concentrated inside this allowed Harrison and Meriweather to come free off the overloaded edge.  Only Gore’s chip on Harrison (which also slowed Meriweather momentarily) saved his quarterback’s life; O’ Sullivan managed to scramble outside to heave a deep desperation pass, but it fell incomplete and the 49ers notched their second straight three-and-out possession.

As was the case in Super Bowl XXXVI, Belichick rarely blitzed but was effective when he chose to do so.  This play wouldn’t have had a chance even if the Patriots only sent one safety.  A pretty gutsy call that worked out in New England’s favor, therefore it’s tough to be too critical of San Francisco.

The Patriots scored a field goal on their next possession.  Clinging to a 4 point lead, the San Francisco offense were faced with their most manageable third down situation yet (1 yard to go) from their own 24:

Situation: 3-1-SF 24 (4:00)

San Francisco Formation: Weak I Twin TE, Keasey offset left

Personnel: WR 88 Bruce, LT 74 Staley, LG 68 Snyder, C 66 Heitmann, RG 69 Wragge, RT 65 Sims, OL/TE 64 Baas, TE 85 Davis, QB 14 O’Sullivan, FB 45 Keasey, RB 21 Gore

New England Formation: 4-4

Personnel: LDE 94 Warren, LDT 75 Wilfork, RDT 93 Seymour, RDE 97 Green, LOLB 50 Vrabel, LILB 54 Bruschi, RILB 51 Mayo, ROLB 96 Thomas, S 37 Harrison, S 36 Sanders, CB 21 O’Neil Hobbs

Play result: F.Gore right tackle to SF 23 for -1 yards

Summary: Initially offset left, Keasey went in motion up behind Davis, which the Patriots (correctly) surmised would be the hole that Gore would attempt to burst through.  Since Wragge served as a pulling guard on this play, this left Heitmann all alone to deal with Wilfork, and the latter shoved him a yard into the backfield before Gore even received the handoff.  The beleaguered running back managed to pick his way between Harrison and Vrabel (blocked by Keasey and Davis, respectively) before being swallowed up by Bruschi and Mayo for a 1 yard loss and yet another punt.

If an offense faced with a 3^rd and short situation uses a personnel grouping with only a single wide receiver, chances are its a run call; this probability skyrockets in a Mike Martz-run offense.  The Patriots were so sure of a Gore rush that they countered with a 4-4 front (the first the author can recall during this young season).

Conclusion

While San Francisco’s offense was able to score three touchdowns (one of which was facilitated by very favorable field position following a turnover), New England achieved its two-fold goal of building an early lead and stopping the run.  This enabled the Patriot defense to primarily key on the pass, call in the appropriate personnel, and get off the field on third down (the only instance where San Francisco converted resulted from a New England penalty).  And boy was it reflected in the time of possession: from the end of the 1^st quarter until the beginning of the 4^th, the 49ers controlled the ball for a paltry 7:53.

San Diego, New England’s next opponent, also runs an “Air Coryell” variant, so it will be interesting to see if this strategy (and success) carries over.

This column has relied on Bill Belichick early and often for relevant quotes.  However banal at times, he offers plenty of noteworthy nuggets provided one knows where to look.  That was certainly true on the occasion of Troy Brown’s retirement press conference.  Here are some of his sentiments spliced with some supporting statistics and facts:

‘Troy is the consummate professional…drafted in the eighth round and we now have seven-round drafts. I think that sums that up.’

Brown was drafted 198^th overall in the 1993 NFL Draft, but keep in mind that there were only 28 teams in the league back then (another indicator of how long he’s been around).  As a sidenote, check out some of the other Pro-Bowl-caliber steals in those late rounds: Brock Marion (196^th overall), Blaine Bishop (214^th), Elvis Grbac (219^th), Trent Green (222^nd).

‘When I was in Cleveland and I talked to Coach [Bill] Parcells, I think it was the year after, it was probably in ’94, he said, “We’ve got this kid from Marshall, a return guy, I don’t know if he is any good or not, but there are some things I kind of like about him.”‘

Apparently Parcells didn’t think too much of Brown as the latter was a late preseason roster cut casualty.  Although re-signed by mid-October, Brown was almost exclusively used as a punt returner; he didn’t catch a single one of Bledsoe’s 400 passes (for 4555 yards 25 touchdowns) during the latter’s historic ’94 season.

‘Perhaps more telling is the fact that Troy managed to stick around so long…’

Patriots owner Bob Kraft, who spoke before Belichick, pointed out that over the course of Brown’s fifteen-year career there were ‘three head coaches, dozens of assistant coaches and 820 players’.  Despite facing unrestricted free agency on three separate occasions, in each instance he chose to re-sign with the Patriots, often times for less money than he would have received elsewhere (i.e. New Orleans offer in 2005).

‘…back in 2000…Charlie and I had several conversations about this guy who’s really a good football player and he hasn’t had the opportunity; what we really thought he could do as a slot receiver and as a deceptive big play receiver, his versatility in the kicking game…’

When finally given his opportunity to start at wide receiver in the 2000 season, Troy caught 83 balls for 944 yards and 4 touchdowns.  Already established as the team’s primary punt returner, he fielded 39 of them for 504 yards (a nifty 12.9 YPR) and a touchdown.

‘Troy has gone on to have a tremendous career here with most catches in franchise history and 120 catches in that ’01 season, including the playoffs.’

The 2001 season was not only a Turning Point in Troy’s career, but for the history of the franchise.

‘Nobody thought he could make the big plays. But all he did was make plays.’

What were some of those big plays?  Let’s break some of them down:

‘I think back to the ’01 season when Troy had all of those punt returns…the Pittsburgh game, for a touchdown…’

Scoreless at the time, the Patriot defense backed the sputtering Steeler offense up to their own goal line and nearly caused a Kordell Stewart safety.  Pittsburgh was penalized half the distance on the subsequent punt attempt and was forced to re-kick.  However, as chronicled in 3 Games To Glory, the ball was set on the right hash mark whereas before the penalty it was on the left hash, much to Cowher’s chagrin (more on this later).  As they had throughout that magical season, the Patriots  capitalized on this opportunity:

Situation: 4-11-PIT 8 (3:55)

New England Formation: 9 Man Picket

Personnel: LCB 24 Law, S 30 Cherry, LB 58 Chatham, LB 52 Johnson, LB 53 Izzo, WR 84 Coleman, CB 27 Buckley, RCB 45 O-T-I-S, RB 35 Pass, S 23 Harris, WR 80 Brown (punt returner)

Pittsburgh Formation: Run and Shoot

Personnel: WR 81 Edwards (gunner), S 40 Bell (slot), LB 53 Haggans (tackle), FB 35 Kreider (guard), C 54 Schneck (long snapper), LB 57 Fiala (guard), LB 51 Jones (tackle), DB 31 Logan (slot), CB 23 Simmons (gunner), FS 27 Alexander (protector), P 4 Miller

Play Result: J.Miller punts 47 yards to NE 45. T.Brown for 55 yards, TOUCHDOWN

Play summary: Brown received Miller’s punt at the 45 and immediately cut up the middle to set up Izzo’s block on Krieder.  A split second later, he contorted to evade a diving tackle by Fiala.  Witnessing Law out in front on the next level, he quickly cut left to setup the latter on Schneck before once again shifting weight to evade backside pursuit by Simmons and Alexander.  With Harris and Buckley teaming up to corral Edwards near the goal line, Brown crossed the goal line to give the Patriots the early lead.

Cowher argued (not without merit) that the erroneous ball placement (right hash mark) following the penalty allowed Brown to return the ball up the middle where he was most dangerous.  Indeed, the previous (nullified) punt attempt was toward the sideline, which seemed in keeping with Pittsburgh’s strategy.  ‘The Chin’ was justified in his concern, as Brown’s combination of moves and downfield vision were flawless in maneuvering through the Steeler’s coverage.

(Kraft): ‘…blocked…field goal kick that he ‘lateraled’ to a teammate…’

Early in the 3^rd quarter, the Patriot defense recovered a Kordell Stewart fumble to set their offense up at the Steeler 35, but the now Bledsoe-helmed unit could muster only 3 yards and turned the ball back over to Pittsburgh following a failed 4^th down conversion.  The Steeler offense finally started to gain momentum as they eeked out 4:04 minute, 8 play, 52 yard drive to the NE 16, where a routine FG would put them within a touchdown and a 2 point conversion of tying the score:

Situation: 4-5-NE 16 (9:11)

New England Formation: Field Goal Block

Personnel: S 23 Harris, LB 50 Vrabel, DT 97 Parker, RDE 98 Pleasant, DT 93 Seymour, DT 96 Mitchell, 80 WR Brown, LB 52 Johnson, LB 54 Bruschi, S 30 Cherry, S 34 Jones

Pittsburgh Formation: Field Goal

Personnel: LB 57 Fiala (slot), DE 94 Bailey (End), RT 77 Smith (tackle), RG 65 Tylski, C 54 Schneck (long snapper), G 68 Vincent (guard), OT 79 Ross (tackle), OL 67 ? (end), TE 84 Tuman (slot), P 4 Miller (holder), K 3 Brown.

Play Result: K.Brown 34 yard field goal is BLOCKED (B.Mitchell), Center-M.Schneck, Holder-J.Miller, RECOVERED by T. Brown at NE 40. T.Brown to PIT 49 for 11 yards. Lateral to A.Harris for 49 yards, TOUCHDOWN.

Play summary: Parker and Pleasant occupied Ross, Vincent and Schneck while Mitchell went over the top of Tylski and surged past Smith to block the kick.  The ball bounced to the side of the field where Brown scooped it up (no small amount of concentration with the ball still spinning around and opponents closing in).  After taking a few steps, the Steeler kicker had caught up to Brown and was about to tackle him, but the latter alertly lateraled to the unimpeded Harris, who went the distance for the second special teams touchdown of the day.

Perhaps realizing that the Patriot offense would struggle against the leagues top-ranked defense (1^st in yards allowed, 3^rd in points allowed), Brown’s heads-up decision helped maintain New England’s margin of victory.

Did the author mention that #80 also caught 8 passes for 121 yards in this contest?

‘…the Super Bowl, the pass across the middle where he got out of bounds and we had no timeouts to stop the clock and set up the game-winning field goal…

The Rams erased a 14 point 4^th quarter Patriot lead by scoring two quick touchdowns.  With their defense running on fumes and only 1:21 remaining in regulation, and having previously been unable to score any points without the benefit of a St. Louis turnover, the New England offense went to work to avoid overtime.  After three passes to J.R. Redmond (mixed with two incompletions), New England was still in its own territory with only :29 seconds remaining.  As it turned out, Brown saved his best for the final drive of the final game of 2001:

Situation: 2-10-NE 41 (:29)

New England: Shotgun 4 WR (Trips Right), Redmond offset left

Personnel: WR 84 Coleman, LT 76 Williams, LG 65 Big Wood, C 77 Compton, RG 63 Andruzzi, RT 64 Robinson-Randall, WR 80 Brown, WR 81 Johnson, WR 86 Patton, QB 12 Brady, RB 21 Redmond

St. Louis Formation: Nickle 4-2-5

Personnel: LDE 91 Little, LDT 77 Moran, RT 90 Zgonina, RDE 98 Wistrom, MLB 59 Fletcher, OLB 52 Polley, CB 35 Williams, CB 21 McCleon, S 20 Herring, S 31 Archuleta, CB 32 Bly

Play result: T.Brady pass to T.Brown for 23 yards

Summary: Only three of St. Louis’ four-man front rushed (Little, Moran and Wistrom) while Zgonina fell back slightly to ‘spy’ Brady.  Meanwhile, Fletcher dropped back deep in pass coverage leaving Polley alone to patrol the middle underneath area.  The undermanned pass rush allowed Brady to be patient in the pocket, and sure enough he found Brown as he cleared Polley’s zone.  #80 tacked on 9 YAC and ran out of bounds at the St. Louis 36 to stop the clock.

The play, ‘Patriot RT 64 MAX ALL IN XQ’ (Patriot Reign Page 78), may have been ‘designed to have all the receivers run in-cuts at a variety of depths downfield’ (The Blueprint Page 168), but Charlie Weis later admitted that the play was intended for Brown.  In fact, the exact same play was called on the previous snap but resulted in one of the two aforementioned incompletions.  In any case, Brown’s pivotal catch-and-run put the Patriots in FG range.  After a quick toss to Jermaine Wiggins moved them a bit closer, Adam Vinatieri boomed the ball through the uprights as time expired to secure the Patriots their first World Championship.

Mind you, this was only one postseason; as Belichick intimated earlier there’s an entire catalog of Troy’s big plays and contributions, many of which we’ve been reliving and relishing over the past week.

Speaking of coach, in his closing the author believes he speaks for all of Patriot fandom:

‘Troy, we have so many great memories of you and all you have done for this organization, this football team and me, personally.  I will be forever grateful and indebted to you.’

Bill Belichick’s opening statement from his morning-after press conference following the Patriot’s worst home loss during his tenure:

“we all obviously feel bad…it was a total team loss. I don’t think we did a good job coaching, starting with me, and didn’t do a good job of playing. We got pretty well beat in every phase…other than special teams.”

Let’s start by assessing the dismal play of the offense:

As the unit and coaches adjust to life without…you know who, they’ve complimented their currently favored run & shoot, spread strategy by returning somewhat to their smash mouth, ‘run to set up the pass’ roots.  Such an offense is predicated on patience and effective run-blocking, the latter being the linchpin to the whole operation.  If you can’t give your backs room to maneuver, you can’t run the ball effectively.  If you can’t run the ball, you can’t lure an extra defender(s) up to the LOS for run support with play action.  If you can’t sell the play action, your deep threats (Moss, etc.) will constantly face double or even triple teams.  For those who still would have preferred the Patriots take some shots down the field despite such coverage, there are not one, not two, not three but four instances where his future HOF predecessor did that very thing to the tune of 4 interceptions, and none resulted in wins.  In short, forcing the ball against a competent defense that’s expecting it is rarely the answer.  But I digress.

How did the big boys do up front run blocking?  The stat sheet reads 79 yards on 20 carries for a seemingly satisfactory 4.0 YPC, including 58 yards on 12 carries (4.8 YPC) in the first half alone; however, those numbers are skewed by two plays: a 19 yard reverse by Welker (yes, it was a true reverse as the ball changed direction) and a 17 yard rush by Morris.  Take away those two plays and the first half rushing average plummets to 2.2 YPC.  By the beginning of the second half New England was down 21-6 and in catch up mode, and thus abandoned its patience with its running attack.  In summation, the Patriots offensive woes were easy to diagnose, if not easy to stomach.

Defensively, however, New England ran into a Miami offense that pulled out all the stops.  It was reminiscent of a Patriot squad that once upon a time started their season 0-2 following a last place campaign, and was desperate to get something going:

2001 Week 6, October 21^st, 2001.  New England at Indianapolis

Best known as the David Patten show; the little-known wide receiver became the first player in over 20 years to catch, throw and run for a touchdown in the same game.  New England’s second thrashing of then division rival Indianapolis in four weeks initiated a midseason Colt meltdown capped off by this Jim Mora gem.

In those days the New England offense was helmed by a coordinator (currently gimpy HC of the NDFI) who, like Miami’s Dan Henning, also had a penchant for deception.  Later in the season the surging Patriots were more confident and cohesive, but that didn’t stop them from digging into their bag of tricks:

2001 Week 15, December 22^nd, 2001.  Miami at New England

Among other plays, this game included a direct snap to Kevin Faulk who passed to Brady for his first (and only) career reception for a critical early first down.  New England and Miami would finish the season with identical records, but the Patriots won the AFC East on tiebreakers.  This was the last Dolphin team to make the playoffs.

The author doesn’t mean to imply that the current Dolphins will emulate the success of ’01 Patriots, but this and other parallels (solid free agent/draft class, competent front office & coaching staff) hint that the former may be in the midst of a turnaround.  In this week’s The Turning Point, we’ll take a look at the ‘Wildcat‘ set that Miami used early and often, and the Patriots had no answer for:

Situation: 2-2-NE 2 (2:32)

Miami Formation: Single-wing, Pennington split left, Williams slotted left, Cobbs split right, Brown under center
Personnel: WR 10 Pennington, WR (slot) 34 Williams, End 80 Fasano, Guard 65 Smiley, C 64 Satele, Guard 68 Ndukwe, Tackle 72 Carey, End 77 Long, Wingback 88 Martin, WR 38 Cobbs, Tailback 23 Brown
New England Formation: Goal line
Personnel: LDE 94 Warren, LDT 99 Wright, RDT 75 Wilfork, RDE 93 Seymour, LOLB 50 Vrabel, SILB 54 Bruschi, WILB 51 Mayo, WOLB 96 Thomas, LCB 37 Harrison, Slot CB 36 Sanders, RCB 29 Sanders
Play result: R.Brown right guard for 2 yards, TOUCHDOWN

Summary: Sanders was initially matched up on Williams but abandoned the latter as he went in motion left-right.  A few heartbeats later Brown took the direct snap, faked the handoff to Williams, who sold it enough for Warren and Vrabel to bite and overpersue.  Protection-wise, Satele (the only lineman playing his natural position), Ndukwe and Carey crashed left to respectively seal off Seymour, Wilfork and Wright.  Smiley delivered the key block by coming around to trap Bruschi, as the latters arm tackle was insufficient to stop Brown on his way into the end zone.

To say the Patriots were caught off guard (pardon the pun) would be an understatement.  If this had been the only time Miami (successfully) ran this formation, it might have been forgivable under the circumstances: the Patriots were faced 2^nd and 2 backed up on their own 2 yard line and had less than 10 seconds to adjust to Dolphins unorthodox formation after the latter broke huddle.  Burning a timeout would have been useless and wasteful given how Miami was moving the football.

However, this would not be only time the Dolphin offense utilized the single wing; after the Patriots second field goal closed the gap to 14-6, Miami used this formation three times on their third scoring drive alone.  On the first occasion, Brown took the direct snap and did in fact hand off to Williams, but the latter tripped as he tried the corner for ‘only’ a 3 yard gain.  Five plays later and immediately following the two minute warning, the Dolphins ran the same exact play with much greater results:

Situation: 1-10-NE 45 (2:00)

Miami Formation: Single Wing, Williams flanked left, Cobbs slotted right, Pennington split right, Brown under center
Personnel: Same
New England Formation: 3-4 over
Personnel: LDE 94 Warren, NT 75 Wilfork, RDE 93 Seymour, LOLB 50 Vrabel, SILB 54 Bruschi, WILB 51 Mayo, WOLB 96 Thomas, LCB 21 O’Neil, SS 37 Harrison, FS 36 Sanders, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs
Play result: R.Williams right end to NE 17 for 28 yards

Summary: Williams once again went in motion left-right while Hobbs and Thomas remained on their side of the field with no one to cover.  After the snap Smiley and Satele, the lineman who normally comprise one of the A gaps, let the slow-footed Wilfork through in favor of downfield blocking.  Ndukwe and Carey double-teamed Warren while Long turned back inside to prevent Bruschi’s pursuit; combined with Martin’s block on Vrabel, this opened up a huge hole for Williams, and downfield blocks such as the one by Pennington on O’Neil (no joke) sprung Williams for a huge gain.

It’s worth pointing out here that in the Patriots version of the 3-4, defensive lineman (especially Wilfork) tend to be more stout and are expected to occupy multiple blockers.  In running these plays to the outside, however, Miami negated their contributions.  On this play specifically, only Fasano (who chipped Seymour) and Ndukwe and Carey (double-teamed Warren) were needed to hold off the line, while most everyone else ran downfield to block.

Three plays later, Miami once again visited the New England endzone:

Situation: 1-5-NE 5 (1:03)

Miami Formation: Same
Personnel: Same
New England Formation: 3-4 over
Personnel: LDE 94 Warren, NT 75 Wilfork, RDE 93 Seymour, LOLB 50 Vrabel, SILB 54 Bruschi, WILB 51 Mayo, WOLB 96 Thomas, LCB 21 O’Neil, SS 37 Harrison, FS 36 Sanders, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs
Play result: R.Brown right guard for 5 yards, TOUCHDOWN

Summary: Exact formation as used on the second play broken down, same call and result as the first.  The only difference was that Hobbs stayed with Williams from pre-snap up until the former realized the latter didn’t have the ball; upon this realization he fell down pivoting back to help Bruschi (who was once again trapped by pulling guard Smiley).

At halftime the Patriots went into the locker room down 21-6.  If they made adjustments they had nothing to show for it as they were beaten twice more by the single wing formation (Brown’s left-handed 23 yard touchdown pass to Fasano, and his 62 yard touchdown run up the middle).

Silver Lining:

Belichick was quick to take personal responsibility for this loss, and rightly so.  The Patriots are very scheme-heavy, and the coaching staff normally succeeds each week in preparing the team for what they can expect from their opponent.  Needless to say, however, they didn’t see this one coming.  However, its tough to be too critical since Miami used a formation that is all but extinct today at the professional level.

Nevertheless, in a copycat league with every team looking for an edge, future Patriot opponents might consider adopting some of Miami’s strategy.  The single wing is simple enough to operate as many of its elements survive to the present day in the guise of punt formations.  Fortunately, the Patriots have a couple of weeks to formulate some contingencies.

Years down the road, an unbiased observer might take a quick glance at yesterday’s box score and wonder how the Patriots managed a 9 point win.  After all, New York gained nearly as much total net yardage (256) as New England (260) while averaging more yards per play (5.2 versus 4.4) and being more efficient on 3^rd down (50% to 43%).

Yet following the game, the normally stoic Belichick was (justifiably) elated with his staff’s preparation and his team’s performance while the AFC East favorite 1-1 Jets were equally effusive as to what went wrong:

Linebacker Eric Barton – “We played hard, but we didn’t make the plays we needed to win the game and that’s about it.  We’ll go and look at the tape and try to correct it.”

Guard Alan Faneca – “It’s tough.  They came out and played well. We left plays on the field. You’re not going to win a game like that against a team like that by doing that.”

Coach Eric Mangini – “We had a lot of positive things today, but there were too many missed opportunities and too many things we could have controlled, whether it was penalties or putting ourselves in a bad position that we didn’t do a good enough job with.”

However generic the explanations, there are certainly some common themes there.  We didn’t make the plays/left plays on the field translates to an overall lack of execution.  A huge missed opportunity was having 1^st and goal at the New England 3 (a chance to take a 7-6 lead) and having to settle for a FG.  The penalties (six accepted for 60 yards) were especially crippling as three of them came on New York’s 2^nd half opening drive and one directly led to the game’s only turnover.  By any definition or measure, that’s putting (your defense) in a bad position.

Let’s start in the middle of that drive to see what caused that critical penalty:

Situation: 1-10-NYJ 39 (11:30)

New York Formation: Ace Twin TE, Franks lined up as H-Back right
Personnel: WR 87 Coles, LT 70 Ferguson, LG 66 Faneca, C 74 Mangold, RG 65 Moore, RT 67 Big Wood, TE 86 Baker, TE 88 Franks, WR 89 Cotchery, Gunslinger QB 4 Favre, RB 29 Washington
New England Formation: 3-4 over
Personnel: LDE 94 Warren, NT 75 Wilfork, RDE 97 Green, OLB 50 Vrabel, ILB 54 Bruschi, ILB 51 Mayo, OLB 96 Thomas, LCB 21 O’Neil, SS 37 Harrison, FS 36 Sanders, RCB 27 Trey Hobbs
Play result: PENALTY on NYJ-J.Cotchery, Offensive Pass Interference, 10 yards

Summary: Vrabel lined up opposite of Franks while Baker, the inside tight end, entered a pass pattern during the subsequent play action fake.  Baker stumbled over Vrabel’s leg however, delaying his route running and leaving Favre with only two viable targets and Warren breathing down his neck from the edge.  With no time to step up in the pocket, Favre fired a flat-footed pass to the single-covered Cotchery who, in coming back to make a play, shoved O’Neil to the ground and made it rain yellow hankies.

In Cotchery’s defense, he was as much a defensive back as a WR in this situation.  But before assigning too much blame to Favre (too late), he may have been emboldened by the previous play in which he rolled out and completed a 28 yard pass on 3^rd and 22 to Stuckey.

Situation: 1-20-NYJ 29 (11:30)

New York Formation: Ace 2 TE, Franks lined up as H-Back right
Substitutions: WR 16 Smith in for Coles
New England Formation: 3-4 over
Personnel: None
Play result: B.Favre pass short right to B.Franks to NYJ 24 for -5 yards

Summary: Facing a balanced ‘big’ set, both OLBs (Vrabel and Thomas) lined up opposite their respective TEs (Franks and Baker).  Perhaps expecting another Vrabel rush, Franks took a step to the outside which, combined with Warren getting decent penetration on Big Wood, provided Bruschi with a clear lane to the backfield.  Favre turned upfield following play action to see Bruschi closing in, but somehow managed to flick the ball sidearm to Franks to avoid an even bigger loss (after applying the hurry/hit on Favre, Bruschi also made the tackle).

Faced with a confounding pass rush, running a play action fake that didn’t fool anyone and took forever to develop probably wasn’t the best call on 1^st and 20.  The dumpoff to Franks to avoid the sack made it 2^nd and 25 instead of 2^nd and 36, but Bruschi turned in a monster effort nonetheless.

Situation: 2-25-NYJ 24 (9:20) 

New York Formation: Shotgun Trips Left (Cotchery, Baker and Franks), Smith split right, Washington offset right
Substitutions: None
New England Formation: 3-4 over
Personnel: S Meriweather in for Sanders (Note: Meriweather may have checked in on the previous play; sometimes the Patriots disguise their coverages so well their deep safeties don’t appear even in 1080i!)
Play result: B.Favre pass short left intended for B.Franks INTERCEPTED by B.Meriweather at NYJ 37. B.Meriweather to NYJ 31 for 6 yards

Summary: Baker and Franks were kept in on 2^nd and long, and Cotchery went in motion left to right to complete the tight bunch.  Defensively, Vrabel and Thomas remained in two point stances off their respective edges, and Meriweather came up a few steps from his safety spot (his initial responsibility apparently the underneath zone).  After the snap every Jet skill position player entered a pass pattern, while this time it was Thomas’ turn to cross the LOS.  Although the New York line held, Thomas and Warren pinched the edges of the pocket enough to prevent Favre from stepping up, and he once again threw a desperation pass off his back foot.  Meriweather, who never took his eyes off of Favre’s, made a leaping interception (his 1st, Favre’s 289th) and returned it 9 yards to set up the Patriot offense at the Jet 31 yard line.

Baker, the intended receiver, was underthown by at least 5 yards.  More on this later.

The ill-advised throws aside, the key to this three play sequence appeared to be the Patriots ability to disguise their 4^th pass rusher on each play (first Vrabel, then Bruschi and finally Thomas); this is one of the advantages of a 3-4 defense.  Jet blockers appeared confused, especially on the second play where Franks keyed on Vrabel and let Bruschi by untouched.  Examples of poor execution include Baker’s stumble on 1^st down and general breakdowns in man pass protection.  While the play calling could stand some scrutiny, how much of it has to do with Favre’s request to dumb things down?

Situation: 1-10-NYJ 31 (9:20) 

New England Formation: Strong I left
Personnel: WR (Flanker) 83 Welker, TE 86 Thomas, LT 72 Light, LG 70 Mankins, C 67 Koppen, RG 74 Yates, RT 77 Kaczur, WR (Split End) 81 Moss, QB 16 Cassel, FB 44 Evans, RB 33 Faulk
New York Formation: 3-4 over
Personnel: LDE 92 Ellis, NT 77 Jenkins, LDE 93 Coleman, OLB 97 Pace, ILB 50 Barton, ILB 52 Harris, OLB 99 Thomas, LCB 24 Revis, FS 25 Rhodes, SS 33 Smith, RCB 34 Lowery
Play result: M.Cassel sacked at NYJ 36 for -5 yards

Summary: Despite being double-teamed by two Pro Bowlers (Mankins and Koppen), massive NT Jenkins collapsed the pocket in less than three Mississippis to bring down Cassel, who was sacked for the third time in four offensive snaps.

Why break down a negative Patriot play in a column singing their praises?  The struggling Patriot offense now faced 2^nd and long and was in danger of squandering terrific field position following the turnover.  Rather than suffer a meltdown as the Jets did on their recently aborted drive, however, New England adjusted with high-percentage situational play calling and great execution, a microcosm of the entire contest and this week’s The Turning Point:

Situation: 2-15-NYJ 36 (8:40) 

New England Formation: Shotgun Trips Left (Moss, Welker and Thomas), Faulk offset right
Substitutions: WR 10 Gaffney in (split right) for Evans
New York Formation: Nickel 3-3-5
Substitutions: CB 30 Coleman in for Thomas
Play result: K.Faulk left guard to NYJ 30 for 6 yards

Summary: All three Jet LBs lined up off the edge (Harris left, Barton and Pace right).  Sensing a blitz, Cassel signaled Welker to go in motion left to right.  Sure enough, Harris and Pace crossed the line, and as Cassel handed the ball off to Faulk, Ellis and Pace were too far in the backfield to make a play.  Blocks by Mankins (on DE Coleman), Thomas (on Barton) and Welker (on CB Coleman) allowed Faulk to pick his way for a 6 yard gain.

A draw play, considered the opposite of play action, is a classic call when an offense is trying to counter an aggressive pass rush.  Six yards on 2^nd and 15 may not seem like much, but it put the Patriots in a much more manageable 3^rd down situation and kept the Jets defense honest.

Situation: 3-9-NYJ 30 (8:02)

New England Formation: Shotgun 3 WR, Welker slotted right, Faulk offset left
Substitutions: None
New York Formation: Dime 4 1 6
Substitutions: LB 96 Bowens in for Jenkins, LB 56 Gholston in for RDE Coleman, CB 36 Barrett in for Thomas
Play result: M.Cassel pass short right to K.Faulk to NYJ 8 for 22 yards

Summary: the above link is worth ~100 TTP words!

Check out New York’s personnel on this play: three of their four down lineman were actually linebackers (Pace at LDE, Bowens at RDT, Gholston at RDE) leaving Ellis as the only ‘true’ lineman; perhaps Mangini was expecting an intermediate/long pass and wanted extra speed on the field.  Regardless, the undersized Jet front was not lost on Cassel, who coolly reminded his line of their blocking assignments.  Harris, who was responsible for Faulk, stood no chance against Yates on the second level as the latter served as the pulling guard on the resulting screen.

On 1^st and goal Sammy Morris ran off left tackle (Ace 3 WR) for no gain, but the Patriots drew Ellis offsides on the next snap; with the free play (run from an unbalanced flexbone?), Cassel patiently rolled right and hit Welker near the sideline to give New England a 3^rd down goal line opportunity at the NYJ 1.  Using their Jumbo goal line package (with Spach and Vrabel as the 2^nd and 3^rd TEs), the Patriots only needed one shot to break the plane.  Gostkowski’s extra point put them on top 13-3, and that would be all the scoring New England needed.

Conclusions:

 The Jets were content to jettison the most accurate passer in NFL history in favor of the most durable.  If they were fed up with Pennington’s weak arm and injury woes, the move makes sense on paper.  But will Favre ultimately be worth the price?  In calling for a truncated play book he’s limiting their options offensively.  And while his high-risk, linebacker-at-quarterback mentality may have worked against a Miami squad in year one of a Parcells overhaul, its far less likely to succeed against elite defenses such as New England’s.  But at least he’s durable!  So much in fact that Green Bay will get New York’s 3^rd round pick if he takes 70% of the Jets offensive snaps (which he’s certain to do).

From the Patriots side, it was a satisfying, solid team-wide effort we haven’t seen since perhaps they defeated San Diego in the 2006 Divisional Round.  And while it certainly wasn’t perfect (as Coach Belichick was ever quick to point out), the Patriots are nevertheless 2-0 against AFC opponents (one within the division) with Miami, a bye and San Francisco on tap.